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Russia’s direct investment of about USD 3 billon in Southern Africa over the 
past decade has placed before the country’s government and corporate sector 
two choices in the accelerating race among foreign investors into Africa. The 
first choice is to follow the established path of direct investment from developed 
economies that has, in the words of a famous African leader Walter Rodney, 
‘underdeveloped Africa’ and involved a serious negative environmental impact. 
The second choice is one that corresponds with the former Soviet Union’s policy 
of mutually advantageous cooperation with Africa. In the current context, this 
will prove possible only through joint cooperation to achieve environmental 
sustainability and economic diversification requiring long-term planning and 
innovation.
The purpose of this interdisciplinary empirical research paper is to investigate 
the current and future state of environmental practices in joint ventures between 
Russia and Southern Africa as compared with other patterns of cooperation 
among emerging market economies.
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This report is part of a series of studies by WWF’s Trade and Investment 
Programme, which aims at identifying and cooperating with actors in the key 
emerging economies (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa and others) 
in order to promote sustainable trade and investment internationally. The 
Programme examines the scope which exists for these countries to become leading 
exporters of, and investors in, sustainable goods and services, whilst emerging 
as key actors in promoting a proactive international sustainable development 
agenda.
For help in collecting materials for this research, the author would like to thank 
G. Scheepers (SASoL), Y.Skubko, G.Shubin and A.Pritvorov (Institute for 
African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences). The author also extends 
her heartfelt thanks to the heinrich Böll Foundation and the Russian embassy 
in Pretoria as well as, personally, Russia’s Ambassador in South Africa V.Lukov, 
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EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY
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Despite the vast geographical distance, and difference in size, between the two 
countries, Russia and South Africa possess a great deal in common. Biologically, 
both are home to leopards, foxes, hoopoes and other species. Institutionally, both 
countries have experienced a recent political transition from highly centralised, 
non-democratic regimes to less-regulated societies. Geopolitically, the two nations 
are leaders of their respective regions – post-Soviet Eurasia comprised of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and Southern Africa, particularly 
in the context of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). 
economically, growth in both countries is heavily based upon the extraction and 
beneficiation of mineral resources, resulting in sustained pressure on the their 
respective unique environmental riches. Finally, both Russia and South Africa 
are referred to as key emerging market economies (eMes).
Russia’s common features and complementarities with South and Southern 
Africa have formed the basis for the direct investment of about USD 3 billion by 
Russian companies into the region’s natural resource sector over the past decade 
(Chapter 2, Table 5). Unsurprisingly, this expansion has involved primarily 
those industries in which Russian companies have been active domestically, 
namely ferrous and non-ferrous metals, diamonds, petroleum and uranium. As 
a result, virtually all the projects implemented by Russian business in Southern 
Africa are energy-intensive in nature and possess a considerable environmental 
footprint.
These investment activities have placed before Russia’s government and 
corporate sector two choices in the accelerating race among foreign investors 
into Africa that involves both ‘traditional’ stakeholders such as the USA and 
european Union, and other eMes, particularly China. 
The first choice is to follow the established path of FDI from developed economies 
that has, in the words of a famous African leader Walter Rodney, ‘underdeveloped 
Africa’ and as a result aroused significant scepticism and criticism. This approach 
implies that as soon as their natural resources deposits are depleted by foreign 
investors for export purposes, African nations are essentially abandoned by these 
investors, and left to deal with severely degraded natural environments and 
virtually no operating mechanisms of economic growth.
The second choice is one that corresponds with the former Soviet Union’s policy 
of mutually advantageous cooperation with Africa. In the current context, this 
will prove possible only through joint cooperation to achieve environmental 
sustainability and economic diversification requiring long-term planning and 
innovation.
over the past two decades, the integration of environmental considerations 
into business decision-making has become a dynamic factor of international 
competitiveness for both nations and corporations. With the consistent 
and sometimes dramatic rise of world commodity prices over this period, 
innovations aimed at reducing energy- and resource-intensity hold the potential 
for significant savings by the private and public sectors. Such ‘greening’ also 
assists both states and companies to prevent environmental degradation, and 
the consequent expenditure associated with large-scale rehabilitation activities, 
as well as assisting in avoidance of the reputational risks associated with such 
environmental damage. environmental footprint is increasingly taken into 
consideration in lending and insurance decisions regarding almost all types of 
projects. This process has materially contributed to technological progress and 
the development of new environmental practices and leapfrogging technologies.
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This study has found no evidence suggesting that the environmental profile of 
Russian investment projects in Southern Africa is any ‘dirtier’ than that of projects 
implemented by Western or African investors. At the same time, there currently 
exist no examples of leapfrogging development projects promoted by Russian 
investors in Southern Africa; in other words projects promoting technological 
or institutional breakthroughs that would assist Southern African countries in 
bypassing the environmentally damaging and unsustainable stages of industrial 
growth that have marred the past of the majority of modern developed economies. 
however there do exist interesting opportunities for bilateral cooperation 
in the field of environmental sustainability, including amongst others joint 
projects in underground coal gasification, gas-to-liquid technologies, small-scale 
hydroelectricity, and energy-saving solutions.
A ‘greener’ approach towards cooperation with Southern Africa does not 
necessarily imply or require a divergence by the Russian government from the 
high-level choices it has already made in terms of its interest in Southern African 
natural resources, its strategy to act as a global guarantor of energy security, and 
its efforts to develop an international assistance programme. What need to be re-
examined in the sustainability context, however, are the instruments by which 
these high-level goals might be achieved.
A number of practical interventions exist by means of which Russian companies can 
enhance the environmental sustainability of their businesses, both domestically 
and in Southern Africa. 
These include:
(i) voluntary standards – the introduction of and compliance with 
more stringent international quality standards and HSE (health, 
safety and environment) certifications, environmental information 
disclosure, open ‘green’ dialogue with local communities and NGos;
(ii) efficiency measures – broader application of existing energy-, water-, and 
other resources saving solutions; 
(iii) corporate social investment – greater attention to local social and educational 
issues,  with the aim of training employees and improving their living 
standards, as well as enabling local communities to find alternative income 
sources once resources deposits are exhausted;
(iv)    analysis – the integration of environmental and social performance indicators 
into ‘due diligence’ and investment approval procedures that would prevent 
‘surprises’ and financial losses (as was the case in the purchase and sale of 
the South African Vanchem vanadium plant by evraz);
(v) responsible ‘green field’ investment – construction of new power generation 
facilities based on renewable resources such as wind and solar radiation, 
with minimal environmental footprint, particularly with regard to Co2 
emissions; 
(vi) research and development – aimed at sustainable technology solutions, 
including footprint mitigation, use of renewable energy sources, sustainable 
transportation, waste recycling, and energy, water and other resource 
savings.  
Despite the current focus of Russian policy- and business decision-makers on 
uranium mining and nuclear energy projects in South Africa and Namibia, 
there exists considerable doubt regarding the long-term financial viability and 
environmental sustainability and expedience of such projects, particularly in 
view of Southern Africa’s abundant renewable energy 
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In view of the increasing participation by Russian banks in projects based on 
natural resource exploitation in Africa, it is essential that Russian financial 
institutions begin applying international sustainability criteria in evaluating 
these projects, for example the UN Principles for Responsible Investment and 
Equator Principles. 
The measures identified in this report form the basis for hedging the commodities 
revenues for the future, by investing them in sustainable business solutions. 
Rethinking Russia’s investment in Southern Africa might involve additional costs 
in the short term, both in financial and administrative terms, but this expenditure 
should be viewed as capital investment, rather than costs. Furthermore, the 
returns on this investment, in the form of increased environmental sustainability 
and national and corporate competitiveness, are certain to be far in excess of the 
initial expenditure for both Russia and Southern Africa, and in fact for the world 
as a whole.
INTRODUCTION
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There exists a plethora of visions regarding the structure and composition of the 
world economy in the mid- to long-term future, but one idea seems to be shared by all 
forecasters: namely that emerging market economies (eMes) will be a major force.
The ground-breaking report Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to 20501 predicted 
that of the current leading industrial economies, only the USA and Japan might 
be among the world’s six largest economies (by GDPs calculated based on the 
exchange rate) in 2050, with the remaining four being Brazil, Russia, India, 
and China (so-called BRIC economies). Furthermore, larger shares of the world 
economy may be taken by other key eMes, including, but not limited to South 
Africa, Mexico, the United Arab emirates, Turkey, Indonesia and Malaysia. 
One question that remains unanswered in the ongoing debate on the future 
of eMes2, is how to make their transformation into economic heavyweights 
environmentally sustainable. 
According to the latest Living Planet Report3, environmental footprint already 
exceeds national biocapacity in many emerging economic powerhouses, most 
notably China, India, Mexico, and South Africa. By contrast, Brazil and Russia 
are the two leading ecological creditors among eMes, since their biocapacity 
currently exceeds their ecological footprint. Globally, however, total environmental 
footprint overshot the earth’s biocapacity by approximately 30% in 2005. This 
reinforces the need for EMEs to embrace so-called leapfrogging technologies to 
bypass the environmentally unsustainable, resource-intensive stages of industrial 
growth that characterised the economic progress of today’s developed countries4.
Precisely what these leapfrogging development patterns might entail, and 
how they should be encouraged, is a matter of intense debate across the 
developmental, economic, scientific and social spheres5. What is clear, however, 
is that along with attempting to design such breakthrough solutions for 
eMes in various international fora, including the World Trade organisation, 
United Nations environment Programme, Global environment Facility 
and others, it is equally vital to identify and promote best environmental 
practices and ‘green’ product chains originating within and between eMes. 
An example of such ‘dream deals’ might be Chinese companies manufacturing 
solar cells from poly-silicon supplied by Russia, in order to sell these products 
at an affordable price into Middle eastern or African, markets, provided 
of course that all participants in this production chain are making use of 
the most environmentally sustainable technologies and products available. 
The purpose of this interdisciplinary empirical research paper is to investigate 
the current and future state of environmental practices in joint ventures between 
Russia and Southern Africa as compared with emerging patterns of South-South 
cooperation. Southern Africa has over the past several years become one of the 
significant recipients of Russian outward investment, particularly in the natural 
resources sector. Using a case-study approach to assess the environmental 
profile of existing and proposed bilateral projects, this report seeks to explain 
why and how it is necessary to ‘Rethink Russian Investment in Southern Africa’. 
1 Wilson, D., and Purushothaman, R., 2003. Dreaming with BRICs: the Path to 2050, Global 
economics paper No. 99, Goldman Sachs. 
2 Winters, A. and Yusuf, S. (eds.), 2007 Dancing with Giants:  China, India, and the Global economy. 
World Bank and the Institute of Policy Studies, Washington, D.C.; Aykut, D. and Goldstein, A., 2006. 
Developing Country Multinationals: South-South Investment Comes of Age. OECD Development 
Center working paper No. 257, Paris. 
3 WWF, 2008. Living Planet Report 2008. WWF-International, Gland.
4 von Weizsacker, e.,  Lovins  A., and Lovins, L., 1997. Factor Four: Doubling Wealth, halving 
Resource Use - A Report to the Club of Rome. Earthscan, London.
5 Perkins, R., 2003. environmental Leapfrogging in Developing Countries: a Critical Assessment and 
Reconstruction // Natural Resources Forum, Volume 27, No. 3, pp. 177-188.
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INVESTMENT 
NEEDS  
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Southern Africa’s vast natural reserves and sustained economic growth 
rates (Tables 1 and 2 below) make the region an increasingly attractive 
investment target, not only for ‘traditional’ stakeholders such as the USA 
and eU, but also for key emerging market economies (eMes). Depending 
upon the avenues into which these investments are channelled, they 
could either result in the destruction of the unique environmental riches 
of Southern Africa, or contribute meaningfully to their preservation. 
The fifteen countries which make up the Southern African region differ 
fundamentally in terms of their levels of economic development, investment 
climates and regulatory environments, as well as in many other variables6. 
For the purposes of this study, however, it is expedient to consider them as a 
whole, for a number of reasons. In the first instance, the development needs of 
all these nations, including the social, environmental and other sustainability 
challenges, are relatively similar, a fact which contributed directly to the 
establishment of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 
1980. Secondly, the diverse and fragile ecosystems of the SADC countries are for 
the most part cross-border in nature. Thirdly, many investment projects in the 
regions, especially in the area of natural resources, also extend across national 
borders. And finally, but not least importantly, Russia’s recent investment 
activities have not been limited to South Africa, but have included Angola, 
Botswana and Namibia with potential for expansion to other SADC countries. 
Figure 1. Southern AFricAn Development community.
6 The fifteen countries of Southern Africa, united by the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC), include: Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, Republic of South Africa (RSA), Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The terms ‘Southern Africa’ and ‘SADC’ are used as synonyms in 
this report.
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It is common knowledge that Southern Africa is faced with some of largest 
development challenges in the world, making the region one of the most difficult in 
which to successfully implement the UN Millennium Development Goals.  These 
challenges include poverty, ongoing famine, the spread of hIV/AIDS and other 
diseases, and a lack of basic infrastructure and services such as education and 
health care. In addition, many countries in the region exhibit severe shortages 
in the supply of housing, safe water and electricity (Table 1). In a number of 
countries, these development challenges are exacerbated by military conflicts, 
political instability and the existence of undemocratic regimes. Social and income 
inequalities persist, resulting in high illiteracy and crime rates. Environmental 
challenges include the degradation of arable land, water shortages and droughts, 
poor practices in terms of utilisation of natural resources use, the negative 
impact of climate change, threats to biodiversity and many more (Table 2). 
Africa’s principal strategy to address these challenges is the New Partnership for 
Africa’s Development (NEPAD), a development framework initiated by five heads 
of state (those of Algeria, egypt, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa) and adopted 
by the African Union in 2001. In many senses, NePAD provides a common 
platform for negotiation by African states with the G8, oeCD and key eMes on 
issues of political relations, security, economic growth and human development. 
It is beyond dispute, both internally and externally, that sustained economic 
growth is an essential element for resolving the majority of the development 
challenges in Southern Africa. Such economic growth will translate into 
employment creation, assist in the eradication of poverty, and also assist in 
securing a surplus in the current account on the balance of payments of these 
countries, in order to free them from an ongoing cycle of indebtedness. At present, 
ten out of the fifteen SADC economies, including South Africa, export less than 
they import , resulting in a balance of trade deficit and a lack of available capital 
for financing development projects. Such capital can therefore be acquired 
only through international public loans or official development assistance. 
Investment in productive capacity is essential for stimulating economic 
growth, and since the majority of the Southern African economies lack 
the capacity to generate sufficient funds from domestic sources, foreign 
direct investment (FDI) is often regarded as the only alternative option for 
securing such capital. For this reason, the UN Millennium Declaration calls 
for greater levels of FDI into Africa. Unfortunately, however, the region’s 
colonial past, as well as its post-colonial experience of FDI that has been 
primarily resource-seeking, with very low levels of profit for local economies, 
have served to provoke scepticism regarding the benefits of FDI to Africa8. 
It is also widely recognised that direct investment is preferable to portfolio 
investment, due to its more permanent nature, and that foreign investment 
in joint ventures and ‘greenfield’ developments is preferable to acquisitions. 
Whereas portfolio investments and acquisitions are on the whole more common 
in Africa than direct investment in new projects, these forms of investment are 
also more dependent upon the volatility of world commodity prices and other 
risks. The levels of such investment often taper off within a relatively short time 
span, without creating workplaces, benefiting local communities or pursuing the 
environmental and other strategic interests of the African nations9. By contrast, 
joint ventures with local partners and ‘greenfield’ developments testify to a more 
long-lasting commitment by foreign investors to the host economies, as they 
create new employment opportunities and broaden the tax base. Furthermore, 
international companies with strategic interests often introduce improved 
corporate social responsibility practices and more stringent health, safety and 
environment (HSE) standards than are required by legislation of host nations.
1.1. 
SUSTAINABILITY 
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COUNTRIES
7 World Bank, 2007. World Development Report 2008. World Bank, Washington, D.C., pp. 342 – 344.
8 Rodney, W., 1983, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa. Bogle-L’Ouverture Publications, London and 
Tanzanian Publishing House, Dar-Es-Salaam; Moran, T., Graham, E. and Blomstrom, M. (Eds.) 2005. 
Does Foreign Direct Investment Promote Development? Peterson Institute for International economics, 
Washingon D.C., pp. 337 – 366.  
9 Mkandawire, T., 2005. Maladjusted African economies and Globalisation // Africa Development,  
No. 30, 1 – 2, p.6.
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Both Russia and South Africa occupy prominent positions amongst eMes as well 
as on the global stage, with each exhibiting particular strengths. Russia, unlike 
South Africa, is both a member of the G8 and a permanent member of the UN 
Security Council, while its economy is three times larger than that of South Africa 
by PPP. Meanwhile South Africa is, unlike Russia, a WTo member and enjoys a 
better reputation for international competitiveness. For instance, in the World 
economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report for 2008/200910 report, South 
Africa ranks 45th in the Global Competitiveness Index, whereas Russia occupies 
51st place amongst the 134 economies participating in the survey (Table 3).
Although natural resource-based industries play a significant role in both 
economies, and their endowments of these resources make them important 
raw materials suppliers to the world market, Russia and South Africa compete 
directly only in a limited number of international trade segments, such as 
diamonds. In many other supply sectors, the resource bases of the two countries 
are complementary (Table 4). 
The many common features shared by Russia and South Africa can act as 
significant drivers for cooperation. Economically, both countries place a high 
degree of emphasis on maintaining their economic growth and raising living 
standard for their populations, possibly with a view to becoming members of the 
organisation for economic Cooperation and Development (oeCD). In particular, 
in accordance with the Declaration of Leaders Meeting of Major economies on 
energy Security and Climate Change, released in July 2008 following the G8 
meeting in hokkaido, Japan, both governments are actively seeking ways to 
diversify the sources of their countries’ economic growth and to reduce energy- 
and resource intensity, in order to remain globally competitive. Institutionally, 
both countries have experienced fairly recent political transitions from highly 
centralised, non-democratic regimes to less-regulated and functionally democratic 
societies. Geopolitically, the two nations are leaders of their respective regions 
– post-Soviet Eurasia comprised of the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS), and Southern Africa in the context of SADC.
These features make Russia and South Africa, as well as many other eMes, 
strategic role players in the process of shifting the world’s economic growth 
onto a more sustainable path. As both producers and consumers of an ever-
increasing amount of resource-intensive products, the two emerging leaders can 
either encourage or discourage environmentally beneficial trade and investment 
policies within the areas of their respective international influence. 
Investment Priorities 
Similarly to their Russian counterparts, South Africa’s political leaders view 
economic growth as the most effective solution to the country’s development 
challenges. As a result, in 2006 the government launched the Accelerated and 
Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (AGSI-SA) with the goal of halving 
poverty and unemployment in the country by 2014. In order to achieve this 
target, the South African government encourages investment, and in particular 
FDI, into:
• Labour-intensive economic activities such as business process outsourcing, 
tourism and infrastructure development, spurred by the selection of South 
Africa to host the FIFA World Cup in 2010 – the first international event of 
this scale in Africa (at present, infrastructure upgrade projects are underway 
in thirteen venues across the country). Labour-intensive projects in these 
and other areas are intended to assist in employment growth and improving 
the skills base of the workforce as well as increase labour productivity;
1.2. PROFILE 
OF SOUTH 
AFRICA
10 WeF 2008. Global Competitiveness Report 2008/2009. WeF, Davos, p. 10;  
http://www.weforum.org/documents/GCR0809/index.html  
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• Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) projects, aimed at channelling 
economic growth to the benefit of the previously disadvantaged segments 
of the South African population11. In terms of FDI, including Russian 
investment into South Africa, this policy implies that preference is given 
to joint ventures with Bee groups rather than projects fully owned by 
foreigners. In this respect, South Africa’s approach is similar to the Russian 
government’s policy of encouraging FDI through joint venture with local 
partners;  
• ‘Greenfield’ projects which generate new employment opportunities and tax 
revenues. In this regard, priority is given to new projects developed with the 
country’s Spatial Development Initiatives (SDIs)12 and Industrial Development 
Zones (IDZs)13, which are elements of an economic development policy aimed 
at levelling territorial disparities in wealth distribution that were created 
under the apartheid regime. These SDIs and IDZs take the form of special 
economic zones, benefiting from public investment in infrastructure and in 
certain cases a relaxed regulatory regime, which are aimed at promoting 
FDI in key export-oriented industries through geographical advantages 
and transportation linkages. Certain SDIs are cross-border in nature, for 
instance the Maputo Development Corridor between South Africa and 
Mozambique, which also benefits Swaziland, Zimbabwe and Botswana, and 
the Lubombo Initiative between South Africa, Mozambique and Swaziland. 
A number of other SDIs and IDZs are in various stages of development and 
implementation across the region;
• Since early 2008, preference has been given to projects that do not rely heavily 
on the existing electricity generation capacity in South Africa, in other 
words either those that are not electricity-intensive or those that provide for 
the construction of their own energy-generation facilities. At present, South 
Africa faces a serious energy crisis, resulting from the high energy-intensity 
of its economy, which is twice the world’s average (Figure 2), as well as from 
under-investment in additional energy generation capacity over the past 
several years. In January 2008 the national electricity supply monopoly, 
eskom, imposed restrictions in energy supply on 138 industrial consumers 
and proposed to shelve new electricity-intensive projects, including those of 
foreign investors, until at least 2013. This represents a significant reversal 
in policy – before the crisis, South Africa’s cheap electricity was actively 
marketed internationally as a benefit for energy-intensive investment and 
large consumers were given discounted tariffs14. 
In 2007, South Africa’s government released the National Industrial Policy 
Framework, aimed at enacting some of the provisions of ASGI-SA. One of the 
deliverables contained in this document is the identification of those sectors 
with highest potential for diversification of the South African economy. These 
include natural-resource based sectors; medium technology sectors (including 
downstream mineral beneficiation); advanced manufacturing sectors; labour 
intensive sectors; and tradable services sectors15.
11 DTI, 2003. A Strategy for Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment.  
Department of Trade and Industry of the RSA.  
12 existing SDIs include: Maputo Development Corridor, Lubombo SDI, Richards Bay SDI, including 
the Durban and Pietermaritzburg nodes, Wild Coast SDI, Fish River SDI; West Coast Investment 
Initiative, Platinum SDI, Phalaborwa SDI,  and Coast-2-Coast Corridor. 
13 existing IDZs include: Kempton Park in Gauteng, Coega and east London in eastern Cape,  
Saldanha in Western Cape and Richard’s Bay in Kwazulu Natal.   
14 Business Report, 17 January 2008, http://www.busrep.co.za/index.php?fSectionId=552&f
ArticleId=4209364 ;  Rosafroekspertiza Newswire, 26 January 2008, http://raex.org/index.
php?productID=733 
15 DTI, 2007. National Industrial Policy Framework. Department of Trade and Industry 
of the RSA, pp. 33 – 38.
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In the sphere of anti-monopoly regulation, South Africa’s focus has been 
primarily on the unbundling of large, often illogical corporations created under 
the apartheid regime16. In all other respects, competition regulation in South 
Africa is similar to that of market economies. Meanwhile, in an increasingly 
globalised business environment, Russia’s investments in South Africa may also 
face anti-monopoly regulations, both within Russia and in the host and other 
economies. For instance, the Evraz Group is Russian-owned, but is registered in 
Luxembourg. As a result, its acquisition of a majority holding in South Africa’s 
highveld Steel and Vanadium Corporation Ltd was subject to clearance not 
only by South Africa’s competition authorities, but also by those of the eU. The 
latter duly imposed a requirement on Evraz to sell part of Highveld’s vanadium 
assets17.
Figure 2. energy intenSity oF bric + rSA economieS AS compAreD With WorlD 
AverAge, 2004
16 heese, K., 2000. Foreign Direct Investment in South Africa (1994 –99) – Confronting 
Globalisation. Development Southern Africa. Vol. 17, No.3. London.  P. 90.  
17 All Africa, 23 April 2008, http://allafrica.com/stories/200804230072.html 
18 oeCD, July 2008. economic Assessment of South Africa. organisation of economic Cooperation 
and Development. Policy Brief. Paris, p. 4.
Source: calculated based on 1) World Bank 2005, pp. 296 - 297; 2) BP 2007, p. 40; 3) UNDP 
 2007, p. 69.
There appears to be increasing criticism of ASGI-SA by liberal institutions. In 
particular, the oeCD has criticised the South African government’s industrial 
policy interventions as being contrary to the requirement to enhance the 
level of competition in the economy18. In spite of this criticism, however, it 
is likely that the current “mildly” interventionist policy will continue after 
the country’s parliamentary and presidential elections scheduled for May 
2009.With respect to FDI, this approach holds the potential for greater 
cooperation between the state-owned enterprises of South Africa and 
those of other eMes, most notably from China, India, and possibly Russia.
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environmental Regulations 
In 1996, South Africa became one of the first countries in the world to include the 
right to sustainable development in its Constitution (Section 24). Furthermore, 
in 1998 the National environmental Management Act was promulgated, 
entrenching the ‘polluter pays’ and other environmental principles in the sphere 
of business operations. other pieces of environmental legislation include the 
environmental Conservation Act (1989), Conservation of Agricultural Resources 
Act (1993), Maritime Zones Act (1994), Marine Living Resources Act (1998), 
National Water Act (1998), Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 
(2002), Air Quality Act (2004), Nuclear energy Act (1999) and National Nuclear 
Regulator Act (1999). In addition, the national Department of environmental 
Affairs and Tourism has developed a National Framework on Sustainable 
Development, which is yet to be signed into law. South Africa’s environmental 
law enforcement agencies include a specialized environmental police force or 
environmental Management Inspectors, popularly known as the ‘Green Scorpions’.
Like Russia, South Africa is a party to a number of international environmental law 
conventions, including the Kyoto Protocol on climate change. Under the Protocol, 
South Africa is classed as a developing country and therefore has no international 
legal obligations to reduce its greenhouse gas (GhG) emissions. South Africa’s 
government has however laid down the regulatory framework enabling Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) projects in accordance with the Protocol. In 
addition, the national Cabinet, as well as the ruling party, have during 2008 publicly 
endorsed the findings of the national Long-Term Mitigation Scenarios (LTMS) 
consultative process, which developed a set of scenarios and policy recommendations 
for shifting the national economy onto a low-carbon development pathway. 
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South Africa’s Investment in Russia 
In order to gain access to international technology pools and new markets, South 
African companies have chosen a number of outward FDI destinations, including 
Russia. however the experiences of South African businesses in Russia have at 
times been controversial; whereas South African investors have achieved some 
successes in the Russian consumer goods and services sector (for example  South 
African Breweries and Naspers), the implementation of large-scale projects by 
South Africa’s corporate leaders has in a number of instances been obstructed by 
bureaucratic interference, a lack of transparency and regulatory unpredictability. 
For example, Sun International’s plan to construct an entertainment centre 
outside Moscow valued at USD 2 billion has been suspended due to a change 
in Russia’s gambling legislation. De Beers, an international diamond monopoly 
with South African roots, has been involved in a decade-long dispute with the 
Russian petroleum company LUKoIL over the rights to the Grib diamond pipe in 
the Arkhangelsk region19. 
South Africa’s foremost investor in Russia is the Anglo-American Corporation 
(although the company’s primary stock exchange listing is in London). Through 
its subsidiary Mondi Business Paper, Anglo-American invested over USD 320 
million between 1997 and 2003 in the acquisition of a paper mill near Syktyvkar 
in the Komi republic. The company has also launched a euro 525 million 
programme to upgrade the mill by 2010, with a view to increasing production 
capacity and decreasing the environmental footprint and negative health 
impacts associated with the facility. In particular, the mill will be converted 
to utilise an environmentally-friendlier technology of elemental chlorine-free 
bleaching. More than half of Mondi’s logging areas in Russia (over 1 million 
hectares) have been certified in accordance with the Forest Stewardship Council’s 
(FSC) voluntary international standards of environmental compliance20. 
In the mining sector, Anglo-American has an alliance with Severstal, one of 
Russia’s largest steelmakers, to explore deposits of nickel, copper and zinc in 
Russia. Anglo Platinum, in partnership with other investors, is involved in 
exploration projects in the Kola Peninsula and Central Urals. 
 19 Mineweb, 16 April 2008, http://www.mineweb.com/mineweb/view/mineweb/en/
page37?oid=51181&sn=Detail
 20 Mondi Group, 2007. Mondi Group Sustainability Report 2007. Mondi Group, p. 28.
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even if South Africa is excluded from the analysis, the remaining SADC countries 
constitute one of the most diverse regions in Sub-Saharan Africa, both in terms 
of their economic performance and their overall level of development (Table 1).
Angola and the DRC possess the largest GDPs in terms of current exchange rate 
and PPP values respectively, but the values for both economies are far smaller 
than that of South Africa. In fact, the GDPs of most SADC states are far smaller 
than the turnovers of the trans-national corporations (TNCs) that are investing 
in the region. At the same time, however, official statistics fail to take into account 
the large informal sectors of each economy, a common feature of the entire SADC 
region. Amongst other industries, this informal sector involves illegal mining 
and oil theft, as well as a large informal retail sector. 
By any measures, Angola is the region’s fastest-growing economy, and one of the 
fastest-growing in the world, albeit from an extremely low base. Angola’s year-
on-year GDP growth increased from 16.9 percent in 2006 to an estimated 24.3 
percent in 2007, with contributions by both oil and non-oil sectors21. 
With the exception of Zimbabwe, all Southern African economies have enjoyed 
robust growth rates since 2000, albeit again from a low base. one of the 
principal drivers of the increase in Southern Africa’s gross regional product 
was the expansion of the natural resource extraction sector, coupled with rising 
commodity prices. 
however, the SADC region has also managed to diversify its sources of economic 
growth through significant growth in the tourism industry. The demand for travel 
and tourism in the SADC region more than doubled from USD 12.7 billion in 
1990 to USD 28.9 billion in 2006, resulting in hundreds of thousands of new jobs. 
During that period, the average annual growth rate of the tourism industry in 
Southern Africa is estimated at 10 percent, which surpasses that of the mineral 
extraction sector23. This development is an important one, as it testifies to the 
growing proceeds to be derived from the conservation of the unique natural 
resources of Southern Africa.
Whereas countries such as Botswana and Namibia are considered to possess 
relatively transparent governmental institutions, in Angola, the DRC and 
Zimbabwe, corruption presents a serious challenge24. Given the histories of these 
countries, it terms of liberation struggles and post-colonial civil conflicts, as well 
as the subsequent challenges of disarmament of various factions, there exist 
serious concerns that wealth generated from mineral resource extraction can be 
used to support corrupt regimes and fund armed conflicts25. The most obvious 
current example of such a scenario is Zimbabwe, where corruption and the 
lack of transition to democratic government has resulted in sustained economic 
deterioration, with the national economy shrinking by 6 percent in 2007. Official 
inflation in Zimbabwe set a world record in June 2008 of 11.27 million percent 
year-on-year26. The ongoing political turmoil, brought about by the refusal of the 
ruling party to accept defeat in the national election held in March 2008, has 
made the country an epicentre for regional destabilisation and illegal migration, 
primarily to South Africa.
1.3. PROFILE 
OF OTHER 
SADC 
COUNTRIES
21 South African Reserve Bank, 2008. Financial Stability Review.  South African Reserve Bank, 
Pretoria, p. 14.  
22 World Bank, 2007. World Development Report 2008. World Bank, Washington, D.C.,  
pp. 340 – 341, 344.  
23 South African Reserve Bank, 2008, p. 14.
 24 Transparency International, 2003. Global Corruption Report 2003. Transparency International, 
Berlin, pp. 248 – 260.  
25 McMillan, J., 2005. “The Main Institution in the Country Is Corruption”: Creating Transparency 
in Angola. Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, Stanford Institute on 
International Studies. Working paper No. 36. 
26 Reuters, 19 August 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/marketsNews/idUSLJ35337020080819  
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Investment Priorities 
Like South Africa, other Southern African states recognise the imperative to 
reduce their heavy reliance on extractive industries and diversify their economic 
growth resources. Similar to other types of capital, natural capital can generate 
sustainable proceeds only if it is preserved. By contrast, the proceeds from 
extractive industries are not sustainable, either in the short term (given the 
volatility of international commodity prices) or the long term (as non-renewable 
natural capital is depleted). A positive example of the preservation of natural 
capital and the generation of sustainable income streams is so-called ‘carbon 
ranching’ in Madagascar, where areas of forest are conserved as carbon sinks, 
thereby earning carbon credit worth several times more than the profits to be 
gained from exploiting these forests for timber27 .
one of the most urgent development challenges is Southern Africa is the 
persistent energy crisis, reinforced by the rapid increase in world prices for 
hydrocarbon resources during 2006 – 2008. In South Africa, an improvement in 
energy efficiency can assist in overcoming supply constraints, but in the rest of 
the SADC region, this option is not viable, since increases in energy resources 
consumption are crucial for economic development and improving basic living 
standards. 
Unlike South Africa, in the majority of Southern African states the primary 
energy resources is fuel wood (Figure 3). Approximately 90 percent of round 
wood production in SADC (outside of South Africa) is consumed as fuel wood28. 
even in urban areas, fuel wood is likely to remain a major source of energy 
for the foreseeable future, especially for low-income households. As a result, 
in many Southern African countries, such as Tanzania and Zimbabwe (Table 
2), deforestation presents a major threat to the region’s biodiversity. There is 
therefore an urgent need for both public and private investment in addressing 
the region’s energy requirements through re- and afforestation, electrification 
and, most importantly, the development of affordable renewable energy 
options. Leapfrogging renewable energy technologies are becoming increasingly 
competitive, especially at times of peak prices for conventional fuels, and may 
prove to be a particularly suitable option for a number of remote African regions 
with no access to national power grids29. 
Increasing water scarcity, coupled with population growth in the region, raises 
concerns regarding possible tensions over trans-boundary water-courses30. This 
problem is aggravated by ongoing desertification and climate change. Although 
the contribution of Africa, and Southern Africa in particular, to climate change 
is negligible, the continent is likely to experience the greatest impact. Increased 
climate variability already affects its water resources, land, forests, and biodiversity 
and these impacts are likely to worsen in the future. There is increasing interest 
in Southern Africa in desalination of sea water to sustain traditional agriculture 
methods. However desalination is an energy-intensive and therefore costly option, 
while in terms of wastage from desalination processes, their environmental cost 
is also considerable. Innovative water saving and management technologies are 
therefore a preferable option, although large-scale leapfrogging solutions in this 
area have yet to be developed31.
27 Du Plooy, P., 2008. Re-Think Investment in (South) Africa. WWF South Africa, Johannesburg, p. 61.
28 FAo 2003. Forestry outlook Study for Africa. Subregional report for Southern Africa. FAo, Rome, p. 8.
29 Rozina, I. / Розина, И., 1988. New Energy Sources for African Countries / Новые источники энергии в 
странах Африки. Institute for African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow.
30 Vremya Novostei, 6 March 2006, http://www.vremya.ru/2006/38/13/146809.html 
31 FAo 2008. Water for Agriculture and energy in Africa: the Challenges of Climate Change. FAo, 
Rome, p. 4.
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environmental Regulations 
The aforementioned sustainability challenges and ensuing investment priorities 
are well understood by the SADC countries, but donor funding and external 
expertise is often required in order to assist in developing and implementing 
appropriate legislation. As a result, environmental and investment-related 
legislation in Southern Africa is unevenly distributed, although it would appear 
to be high quality in certain countries, particularly Botswana, Mozambique, 
Tanzania and Namibia. The problem, however, lies not in the development of 
legislation, but rather in the limited abilities of Southern African governments to 
enforce this legislation and implement corresponding strategies, particularly in 
the light of a lack of resources and corruption. 
In a number of instances, due to better enforcement practices, international 
regulations applicable to public and private investment projects in the region 
have proven more efficient than national requirements. This is particularly 
the case in the execution of World Bank projects and compliance with UN and 
WTo agreements signed by SADC countries. In addition, such international 
compliance includes voluntary commitments by companies operating in Africa 
under, amongst others, the UN Global Compact, Global Reporting Initiative and 
the ‘Equator Principles’ for access to project finance. 
CHAPTER 2. 
RUSSIA’S  
RETURN TO 
SOUTHERN  
AFRICA
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During the 1960s, 70s and 80s, the former Soviet Union provided considerable 
assistance to independence movements in many African countries, not least to 
the banned African National Congress and its allies in their armed struggle 
against the apartheid regime in South Africa. This contribution, coupled with 
the fact that many African leaders personally received education and support 
from the USSR, created a generally positive, anti-colonialist image of Russia in 
the region. however, this favourable reputation has been somewhat tainted by 
the inconsistency of Russia’s policy towards Africa following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. 
At present, Russia is in the process of partially restoring the position it previously 
occupied in Southern Africa. Nevertheless, there remains a divide between the 
Russian political leadership’s newly-revived long-term strategic interest in 
Southern Africa, and Russian business involvement in the region, which is often 
driven by short-term priorities. At the same time, however, signs do exist that 
this divide can be bridged.
Over the past several years, Sub-Saharan Africa has received increasing attention 
from Russia’s political leadership. This study has singled out three key factors 
explaining this phenomenon:
• Russia’s strategic interest in gaining access to Southern African natural 
resources. According to official governmental forecasts, within the next 
decade, Russia’s economically viable reserves of zinc, manganese, chromites, 
diamonds, uranium, gold, copper, nickel, platinum metals and oil will 
be depleted (Table 4). Although Russia possesses significant untapped 
resource deposits, these are often difficult to access and costly to develop. 
For this reason, and given the volatility of world commodity prices, it is in 
the economic interests of Russia to gain access to sources of supply of such 
strategic minerals in regions where costs are lower, in particular in Southern 
Africa. This strategic interest of Russia’s is reinforced by the increasing 
competition for African natural resources, not only from ‘traditional’ 
stakeholders such and the USA and eU, but also from key eMes, especially 
China. 
• Russia’s strategy to act as a global guarantor of energy security, as was 
outlined, for instance, during the G8 Summit in Saint Petersburg in 2006. 
In this context, Africa is regarded as both a rich resource base, especially for 
uranium, and a market for Russian energy-related value-added products, 
including nuclear reactors32.
• Russia’s efforts to develop an international development assistance 
programme comparable with those of other G8 powers and members of the 
oeCD, in which Russia is also seeking membership. Russia is represented 
on the G8/oeCD Africa Partnership Forum and in 2007, Russian President 
Vladimir Putin approved the Concept of Participation in International 
Development Assistance of the Russian Federation. According to the 
Concept, Russia’s oDA activities will prioritise ‘projects and programmes 
involving the use of goods and services originating in Russia’33. 
2.1. THE 
SOUTHERN 
AFRICAN 
DIMENSION 
OF RUSSIA’S 
POLICYA
32 Geopolitics, 22 March 2007, http://www.geopolitics.ru/news/afr-004.htm
33 Concept of Russia’s Participation in International Development Assistance, 2007. Approved by the 
President of the Russian Federation on 14 June 2007, p. 12.
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Source: 1) Long-Term State Programme of the Research of Subsoils and Reproduction of the 
 Mineral and Raw Materials Base (2005 – 2010 and through 2020) of the Russian 
 Federation, pp. 27 – 29; 2) SADC 1997; 3) US Geological Survey 2007.
tAble 4.  ruSSiA’S nAturAl reSource bASe complementAritieS With Southern AFricA
mineral
year in which russia will depleted SADc countries that possess 
reserves of the mineral
(in alphabetical order)
SADc 
share in the 
world’s total 
resources of 
the mineral
economically 
producible 
reserves
all reserves
lead 2007 Beyond 2025 Namibia, South Africa, Zambia  –
manganese ores 2008 Beyond 2025 DRC, South Africa 83 %
Zinc 2011 Beyond 2025 drc, nAmiBiA, zAmBiA  –
chromium ores 2013 Beyond 2025 Madagascar, South Africa, zimbabwe 93 %
Diamonds 2013 Beyond 2025 Angola, Botswana, DRC, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania > 50 %
Quartz 2013 2013 Madagascar, Mozambique  –
tin 2015 Beyond 2025 DRC, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Zimbabwe  –
uranium 2015 Beyond 2025 Angola, DRC, Namibia, South Africa, zambia 12 %
gold 2015 Beyond 2025 Angola, DRC, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe 53 %
oil 2015 Beyond 2025 Angola, drc  –
copper 2016 Beyond 2025 Angola, Botswana, DRC, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe 8 %
nickel 2016 Beyond 2025 Botswana, South Africa, Tanzania, zimbabwe 10 %
tungsten 2016 Beyond 2025 namibia  –
platinum-group metals 2018 Beyond 2025 South Africa, Zimbabwe 88 %
graphite 2018 Beyond 2025 Madagascar, Mozambique  –
coal Beyond 2025 Beyond 2025
Botswana, DRC, Madagascar, South 
Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, 
zimbabwe
12 %
phosphate Beyond 2025 Beyond 2025 Angola, South Africa, Tanzania 10 %
potash Beyond 2025 Beyond 2025 Botswana  –
bauxite Beyond 2025 Beyond 2025 Angola, Madagascar  –
iron ores Beyond 2025 Beyond 2025 Angola, Botswana, South Africa, Tanzania, Zimbabwe 5 %
natural gas Beyond 2025 Beyond 2025 Angola, DRC, Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania  –
vanadium Beyond 2025 Beyond 2025 South Africa  –
Fluorspar Beyond 2025 Beyond 2025 Angola  –
Salt Beyond 2025 Beyond 2025 Botswana, Madagascar, Namibia, South Africa  –
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This study estimates Russia’s direct investment stock in Southern Africa at 
USD 3 billion as of June 2008, based upon the aggregation of publicly reported 
values of Russian acquisitions in the region (see Table 5 for details). This puts 
Russia’s FDI in Southern Africa at approximately 14 percent of the total value 
of Russia’s outward direct investment stock, which was officially worth USD 21 
billion at the end of June 200834. The estimate includes assessments of large-
scale Russian investments in the region that official statistics might have failed 
to take into account, because transactions are often effected via third countries. 
In particular, Russia’s largest acquisition in Southern Africa to date resulted 
from Norilsk Nickel’s takeover of LionOre, a Canada-based company with key 
operating assets in South Africa, Botswana and Australia. A further example is 
the acquisition of South Africa’s Highveld Steel and Vanadium Corporation by 
evraz, a Russian capital group registered in Luxembourd. 
The bulk of Russian investment into Southern Africa occurred during 2006 and 
2007. Based on publicly available sources, including corporate press releases 
and media reports, this report also estimates the aggregated value of Russian 
companies’ outstanding proposals for medium-term investment in SADC 
countries at up to USD 5 billion, although it is unlikely that all these proposals 
will be implemented, particularly in view of the financial crisis which struck 
world markets during the second half of 2008.
It would appear that two considerations are the driving forces behind Russian 
business expansion in Southern Africa:
• Depletion of the resource base in Russia (Table 4). This driver is a particularly 
explicit one, for example in the case of ALRoSA, a Russian diamond 
monopoly owned by the federal government and the regional government 
of Yakutia. African diamond reserves are generally more easily accessible 
than the remaining underground diamond deposits in Yakutia, and as a 
result, according to the company’s President Sergey Vybornov, ALRoSA 
‘should use every chance to increase its resource base in Africa’35. 
• Interest in acquisition of undervalued assets that can help to boost the 
companies’ share price. World prices for non-ferrous metals such as nickel, 
manganese, platinum group metals, gold, chromites, vanadium, and others 
are highly volatile. As a rule, during periods of high prices, the increased 
revenues earned by industry leaders enable them to undertake large-scale 
mergers and acquisitions. By contrast, during periods of falling prices, the 
assets producing these strategic metals are often disposed of. In accordance 
with this logic, significant acquisition activities were undertaken by 
Russian metal and mining companies between 2006 and 2008, based on 
high prices for both steel and non-ferrous metals. This acquisition drive 
began domestically and expanded to europe, North America, Australasia 
and Africa. Against this background, it is probable that some of the existing 
Russian investors in Southern Africa may withdraw in the short to medium 
term. Such a withdrawal took place in 2006, when the privately owned 
Russian company Norilsk Nickel, profitably resold its holding in South 
Africa’s Goldfields Corporation. 
The interaction of these two factors has resulted in differing policies on the 
part of Russian businesses operating in Southern Africa. on one hand, resource 
depletion holds a significant strategic impact on Russian business development 
and necessitates long-term planning. 
2.2. RUSSIAN 
BUSINESS’ 
INTERESTS 
IN SOUTHERN 
AFRICA
34 Rosstat, 15 August 2008. on Foreign Investment in Russia in the First half of 2008 / Об 
иностранных инвестициях  в I полугодии 2008 г. Russian Federal Service of State Statistics, 
Moscow. 
35 ALRoSA, 2008. Speech of ALRoSA President Sergey Vybornov at the Company’s Management’s 
Meeting in Mirny on 29 March 2008. ALRoSA, Mirny, p. 1.
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It would appear, however, that geographic expansion is not the only option in this 
regard. Whereas Western resource-based multinationals such as Shell, Alcan, Rio 
Tinto, and others have been expanding their operations worldwide, they have also 
invested extensively in technology to improve mineral resources recovery rates 
and have as a result improved the viability of marginal reserve deposits36. Such 
diversification of companies’ reserves ‘portfolio’ might go some way to explaining 
the fact that while Russian-based ALROSA is developing diamond mines in 
Angola, South Africa’s De Beers is investigating diamond mining projects in the 
north of Russia37.
On the other hand, the cost of resource development and field operations in Southern 
Africa is often much lower than in Russia, resulting in higher profit margins for 
operating companies, especially during periods of high international commodity 
prices (for oil extraction statistics see Figure 4). This is of particular importance 
to Russian companies that are involved in a process of property redistribution, 
mergers and acquisitions. Their owners have generally paid little attention to long-
term considerations, and have in fact in some instances been guided primarily by 
an interest in the acquisition of undervalued assets with a view to re-sale in the 
short to medium term38. In many cases, this has resulted in limited ‘greenfield’ 
investment, both in Russia and abroad. As was argued elsewhere39, the lack of such 
strategic interest also leads to limited investment in new environmentally friendly 
technologies, the acquisition of which, as a rule, provides a return on investment in 
the long run rather than the short or medium term. 
As a result, the sustainability record of Russian companies in Southern Africa has 
been mixed. For example, Norilsk Nickel’s investments in nickel mining companies 
in Southern Africa have generally been regarded as beneficial both by the companies 
and the local communities. The Nkomati project in South Africa is a 50/50 joint 
venture, in which Norilsk Nickel’s local partner is the Bee company African 
Rainbow Minerals. This arrangement ensures that the joint venture complies 
with the South African government’s priorities in terms of improving the economic 
status of previously disadvantaged sections of the population. Furthermore, Norilsk 
Nickel reported its plans to commit USD 830 million to investment in ‘greenfield’ 
developments and the modernisation of its facilities in South Africa and Botswana 
by 201040, though in the new circumstances of the financial crisis in early 2009 the 
company announced its plans to scale down its overseas investment programme 
first in Australia and then in Botswana and South Africa41. Finally, the company 
is in the process of introducing an environmentally friendly technology, known as 
Activox, into its operations in the region42. 
36 Smart Money, Moscow, № 9 (99), 17 March 2008, http://www.smoney.ru/article.
shtml?2008/03/17/5151  
37Mineweb, 16 April 2008, http://www.mineweb.com/mineweb/view/mineweb/en/
page37?oid=51181&sn=Detail 
38 Kim, A. / Ким, А., 2005. Russians on the Global Sale / Русские на мировой распродаже. Finans, 
№ 15, 18 – 24 April 2005, http://www.finansmag.ru/15293
39 Gerasimchuk, I./  Герасимчук, И., 2007. Environmental Practice of Transnational Corporations /
Экологическая практика транснациональных корпораций. WWF Russia, Moscow, pp. 66 – 68.
40 Mineweb, 26 September 2007, http://www.mineweb.net/mineweb/view/mineweb/en/
page36?oid=37493&sn=Detail
41 RIA Novosti, 17 January 2009; http://www.rian.ru/economy/20090117/159469833.html 
42 Sunday Standard, 20 May 2007, http://www.sundaystandard.info/news/news_item.
php?GroupID=1&NewsID=1499
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Another privately-held Russian metals company, Evraz, has accorded less 
consideration to the environmental aspects of its Southern African acquisition 
activities. In 2006, driven by an interest in acquiring a larger share of the global 
vanadium market, Evraz acquired the Highveld Steel and Vanadium Corporation 
Ltd in South Africa for USD 678 million43. The assets acquired by Evraz were 
generally characterised by poor environmental performance. In october 2007, 
an inspection by the ‘Green Scorpions’ on highveld Steel’s Vanchem vanadium 
plant exposed a number of transgressions of environmental legislation, including 
the contamination of groundwater, a criminal offence in terms of the Water Act44. 
These transgressions undoubtedly contributed to the situation in which evraz 
was unable to recoup its investment, when it was forced by european competition 
authorities to divest itself of some of highveld’s assets45. According to media 
reports46, evraz is as a result currently reviewing highveld’s capital expenditure 
strategy, in order to place more emphasis on investments in environment- and 
safety-related equipment, systems and services.
The environmental aspects of ‘greenfield’ investment projects proposed by Russian 
companies also merit some attention. These proposals include the development 
of manganese and uranium fields, as well as construction of a manganese smelter 
in South Africa by Renova, the development of uranium fields by a consortium 
of Russian companies in Namibia, the construction of an aluminium smelter by 
RUSAL and a fertiliser plant by Azot in South Africa, a number of small mineral 
prospecting projects by Sintez in Angola and Namibia, and oil prospecting and 
development by ALRoSA, Gazprom and LUKoIL in Angola. 
43 Smart Money, 9 october 2006, http://www.smoney.ru/article.shtml?2006/10/09/1476 
44 Business Day, 5 october 2007; http://www.businessday.co.za/articles/article.
aspx?ID=BD4A579828  
 45 Business Report, 24 April 2007, http://www.busrep.co.za/index.php?fSectionId=553&fArticleId=4
370487
 46 engineering News, 17 August 2007, http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article.php?a_id=114089
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There exists no evidence to suggest that these ‘greenfield’ developments by Russian 
companies are any less environmentally responsible than projects undertaken 
by Western or African companies in the same industries. however, the common 
feature uniting all these projects proposed by Russian investors is their high 
energy intensity. Russian investors are naturally aware of the current electricity 
crisis in South Africa, and have expressed a readiness to assist in increasing 
local electricity supply capacity. ALROSA has already completed the first phase 
of construction of the Chicapa hydroelectric station in Angola, to support its core 
diamond mining business, and is currently in the process of implementing the 
second phase of this project. RUSAL is considering the construction of a captive 
power station for its proposed aluminum smelter. At the same time, however, the 
major priority in terms of energy cooperation with Southern Africa has up to now 
been the promotion of Russian nuclear energy solutions. 
At present, South Africa is the only African country operating a nuclear power 
plant, namely Koeberg (containing two reactors) near Cape Town. Russia is 
currently supplying Koeberg with enriched uranium derived from diluted ex-
military stockpiles47. South Africa’s national electricity monopoly, eskom, 
recently announced plans to invite foreign companies to build six large-scale 
nuclear reactors by 2025 at a cost of approximately USD 90 billion. In addition, 
South Africa has for the past several years been attempting to develop its own 
design for small-output Pebble-Bed Modular Reactors (PBMR) for both domestic 
use and export48. 
These developments, as well as the availability of large-scale uranium deposits 
in South Africa and Namibia, have provoked increased interest on the part of the 
Russian government and Russia’s state-owned nuclear corporation Rosatom in 
nuclear cooperation with these two countries. Rosatom is currently promoting a 
similar bilateral cooperation pattern with a number of uranium-rich countries, 
in order to mine uranium abroad, enrich it in Russia in the Angarsk facility, and 
construct nuclear power plants in these countries to utilise the nuclear fuel from 
Russia49. 
In view of a shortage of operating capital and local expertise in South Africa and 
Namibia, Rosatom has been attempting to partner with other Russian investors 
to start uranium exploration and production activities in South Africa and 
Namibia. During 2006 and 2007, Rosatom agreed that privately-owned Renova 
would act in this capacity, but in 2008 Renova started scaling down its Southern 
African uranium plans50. 
Russia’s efforts to gain contracts to provide nuclear power plants construction 
services in SADC countries have thus far borne very little fruit. According to 
media reports, in early 2008, South Africa’s government excluded Rosatom from 
the shortlist of possible participants for a tender to construct the first of the six 
planned large-scale nuclear reactors, instead giving preference to French and 
American companies51. In Namibia, the Russian government and Rosatom have 
been promoting a proposal for a small floating nuclear power plant52. one of the 
possible uses for this plant is sea water desalination. however the prospects for 
this project are also unclear. 
47 Rosatom, 25 November 2004, http://www.minatom.ru/News/Main/view?id=9213&idChannel=71 
48 The Times, 14 January 2008, http://www.thetimes.co.za/News/Article.aspx?id=680981 
49 Polit.Ru, 6 February 2008, http://www.polit.ru/news/2008/02/06/simonov.html
50 Rosafroekspertiza Newswire, 2 April 2008, http://raex.org/index.php?productID=789
51 Mineweb, 18 March 2008, http://www.mineweb.com/mineweb/view/mineweb/en/
page38?oid=49574&sn=detail
52 Kornysheva. A./ Корнышева, А., 2007. Sun, Air and Ore / Солнце, воздух и руда // Kommersant-
Dengi. № 14 (620), 16 April 2007, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=759014 
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Consideration of the aforementioned cases provides scope for the following 
conclusions:
• Russian businesses that are active in Southern Africa have in general 
pursued investment projects only in the industries in which they have been 
operating in Russia, namely ferrous and non-ferrous metals, diamonds, 
petroleum and uranium. All these projects are energy intensive and possess 
a considerable environmental footprint.
• There is no evidence suggesting that the environmental profile of Russian 
investment projects in Southern Africa is any ‘dirtier’ than that of projects 
undertaken by Western or African investors in the same industries.
• At the same time, there exist no examples of leapfrogging development 
projects promoted by Russian investors in Southern Africa; in other words, 
breakthrough projects that would enable Southern African countries 
to bypass the environmentally damaging and unsustainable stages of 
industrial growth that have marred the past of the majority of developed 
countries.
These trends are not particularly surprising, since they would appear to mirror 
existing business practices within Russia53. Russia’s own economy is energy- and 
resource-intensive, and until this situation changes, it will be premature to expect 
Russian investors promote leapfrogging development patterns abroad. At the 
same time, however, given the considerable environmental footprint of the projects 
being undertaken by Russian companies in Southern Africa, any steps towards 
improving their environmental practices are certain to reduce the sustainability 
risks attached to these projects. 
53 Poussenkova N. and Solntseva e., 2007. Russian Companies in the 21st Century – Towards 
Competitive Corporate Citizenship. WWF-Russia, Moscow.
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Post-Soviet Russia is the latecomer amongst large-scale investors into African 
natural resources, having been preceded by both ‘traditional’ stakeholders 
such as the USA and eU, and by other BRICS countries, particularly China54. 
however, this is a race that has continued over many decades and resulted in a 
great deal of scepticism about FDI in Africa. 
Whereas countries such as Norway, Canada and Australia have gained significant 
upstream and downstream spillover benefits from inward FDI in extractive 
industries, in other resource-rich countries, especially in Africa, such FDI has 
generally benefited local economies and societies to a very limited extent55. This 
implies that, as soon as foreign investors deplete deposits of natural resources 
of African nations, they as a rule abandon these host countries, and leave them 
with severely degraded environments and virtually no operating mechanisms of 
economic growth.
In this regard, the obvious question to be answered is whether the emerging 
South-South56 cooperation will differ substantially from the historic North-South 
relationship. EMEs have naturally not engaged in colonisation-type activities in 
the past, but this fact is not sufficient to ensure that their investments provide 
tangible benefits to African economies. In particular, China’s expansion in Africa 
has already given a rise to a tendency for scholars and journalists, primarily in 
developed countries, but to some extent also in Africa, to voice their concerns 
regarding a potential form of ‘neo-colonialism’ being introduced by Beijing57.
In the case of Russia, the possibility exists to channel its investment into Africa 
into more sustainable avenues. Russia, itself a resource-rich nation and an 
ecological creditor, faces an urgent requirement to diversify the sources of its 
economic growth, just as is the case with the majority of African countries.
The heavy reliance by the Russian and Southern African economies on the 
extraction of non-renewable resources is of course not sustainable in the long 
term. These resources will by their very nature be depleted at some point, even 
if the most efficient technologies are applied, while the growing urgency to 
address the issue of climate change is certain to significantly decrease the size 
of world markets for fossil-fuel resources. At the same time, volatile rises in 
world commodity prices make a number of previously uncompetitive renewable 
and resource-efficient solutions increasingly viable. As a result of these factors, 
the world’s development path is sure to move onto a more sustainable footing in 
the medium to long term, potentially leaving resource-based economies such as 
those of Russia and Southern Africa outside the new mainstream. In the words of 
Sheik Ahmed Zaki Yamani, Saudi Arabia’s oil minister in 1970s, "the Stone Age 
didn’t end for lack of stone, and the oil age will end long before the world runs out 
of oil”58; the same holds true for many of the world’s other mineral resources.
54 Commerce and Industry Chamber of the Russian Federation / ТПП РФ, 28 February 2006. 
Russia and Africa in the Short- and Mid-term. / Россия и Африка в кратко- и среднесрочной 
перспективе. Moscow.
55 Moran, T., Graham, e. and Blomstrom, M. (eds.) 2005. Does Foreign Direct Investment Promote 
Development? Peterson Institute for International economics, Washingon D.C 
56 Though Russia is geographically in the North, politicians and scholars sometimes include it into 
the notion of ‘South’ due to other common development features (Aykut and Goldstein 2006). 
57 Kornegay, F., 2008. Africa’s Strategic Diplomatic engagement with China // New Impulses from 
the South. China’s engagement of Africa. Centre for Chinese Studies, University of Stellenbosh, 
South Africa. 
58  The New York Times, 25 August 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/21/magazine/21oIL.
html?pagewanted=all
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over the past two decades, the integration of environmental considerations into 
business decision-making has become a significant factor in the international 
competitiveness of both nations and corporations59. Improved efficiency in the use 
of energy and other resources holds the potential for significant savings by the 
private sector. Such ‘greening’ also assists both states and companies to prevent 
environmental degradation, and consequent expenditures on rehabilitation 
activities, as well as to avoid the reputational risks associated with such 
environmental damage. environmental footprint is increasingly taken into 
consideration in investment and insurance decisions regarding virtually all types 
of projects. This process has materially contributed to technological progress and 
the development of new environmental practices and leapfrogging technologies, 
which provide significant competitive advantages to businesses and nations.
At the same time, however, it would be premature to expect Russian investors in 
Southern Africa to pursue better sustainability and corporate social responsibly 
practices in Africa than they do in Russia. In many cases, the primary focus of 
Russian businesses is the maximisation of profits for their owners in the short term, 
often with a view to a future sale. Nevertheless, it would be unfair to apportion 
blame for this short-sightedness exclusively to the Russian private sector, since 
it remains the case that in both Russia and Southern Africa, the investment 
climates continues to be somewhat unpredictable, with significant uncertainty 
regarding possible changes in taxation regimes and various regulatory practices. 
Given this scenario, it would appear that an increased focus on long-term planning 
and sustainability issues on the part of Russian companies might be prompted by 
an improvement in the transparency and predictability of the domestic business 
environment by the governments of both Russia and Southern Africa. 
Among other factors, the introduction of more stringent environmental regulations 
in Russia will serve to prepare Russian business for competition in international 
markets, including those in Southern Africa. In this regard, a positive, albeit 
somewhat delayed, measure is the Russian Presidential decree of 4 June 2008, 
on Measures to make the Russian economy More energy and environment 
Efficient.  
A ‘greener’ approach towards cooperation with Southern Africa does not 
necessarily imply or require a divergence by the Russian government from the 
high-level choices it has already made in terms of its interest in Southern African 
natural resources, its strategy to act as a global guarantor of energy security, and 
its efforts to develop an international assistance programme. What need to be re-
examined in the sustainability context, however, are the instruments by which 
these high-level goals might be achieved.
59 Porter, M, van der Linde, C., 1995. Green and Competitive: ending the Stalemate.  harvard 
Business Review. № 73, September-October, pp. 120-155; Esty, D., Porter, M., 2001. Ranking 
National environmental Regulation and Performance: A Leading Indicator of Future 
Competitiveness? The Global Competitiveness Report 2001-2002. N.-Y., p. 78.
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Practical measures which can be implemented by Russian companies, in order to 
enhance the sustainability of their businesses both domestically and in Southern 
African, include the following:
• Voluntary standards – the introduction of and compliance with more 
stringent international quality standards and HSE (health, safety and 
environment) certifications, environmental information disclosure, open 
‘green’ dialogue with local communities and NGos
• Corporate social investment – greater attention to local social and 
educational issues, with the aim of training employees and improving their 
living standards, as well as enabling local communities to find alternative 
income sources once resources deposits are exhausted
• Analysis – the integration of environmental and social performance indicators 
into ‘due diligence’ and investment approval procedures that would prevent 
‘surprises’ and financial losses (as was the case in the purchase and sale of 
the Vanchem vanadium plant by evraz)
• Research and development – aimed at sustainable technology solutions, 
including footprint mitigations, use of renewable energy sources, sustainable 
transportation, waste recycling and energy, water and other resources 
savings
As mentioned, Norilsk Nickel’s application of ‘Activox’ technology at its Southern 
African mines can serve as an example of positive actions in this area (even 
though this technology was initially developed in Australia).
Russia’s focus on energy cooperation with Southern Africa can assist in resolving 
one of the most pressing development issues in the region, namely access to 
energy. In this regard, potential exists for the following contributions by Russian 
companies:
• Efficiency measures – broader application of existing energy-, water-, and 
other resources saving solutions 
• Investment – construction of new power generation facilities based on 
renewable resources such as wind and solar radiation, with minimal 
environmental footprint, particularly with regard to Co2 emissions
• Research and development – particularly in terms of leapfrogging 
technologies, both in the sphere of energy savings and the use of renewable 
energy sources
In this regard, two interesting examples exist of cooperation between Russia and 
South Africa. The first concerns the cooperation between South Africa’s state-
owned electrical utility, Eskom, and the Russian scientific community in the field 
of underground coal gasification technology. This technology allows the energy 
content of coal to be extracted without mining, instead providing liquid petroleum 
gas as an input for electricity generation. This method of energy extraction can 
produce significant conversion efficiency improvements over conventional coal-
fired electricity generation60. At present, however, the majority of the interest, 
and potential investment, in this technology is from eskom, rather than from 
Russian companies.
3.1. RUSSIA’S 
STRATEGIC 
INTEREST IN 
SOUTHERN 
AFRICAN 
NATURAL 
RESOURCES
3.2. RUSSIA’S 
STRATEGY 
TO ACT AS 
A GLOBAL 
GUARANTOR 
OF ENERGY 
SECURITY 
 60 Reuters, 23 April 2008, http://factiva.com
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The second example of cooperation between Russia and South Africa concerns the 
‘gas-to-liquid’ technology owned by South Africa’s PetroSA and SASOL, which has 
reportedly attracted the attention of Russia’s two state-owned petroleum majors, 
Gazprom and Rosneft.  This solution holds the potential to significantly reduce 
gas flaring in Russia. According to the Russian Ministry of Natural Resources, 
Rosneft plans to build a GTL plant at its Sakhalin facility, with support from 
PetroSA and SASoL61.  
Despite the current focus by Russian policy and business decision-makers on 
uranium mining and nuclear energy projects in South Africa and Namibia, 
there exists considerable doubt regarding the long-term financial viability 
and environmental sustainability of such projects. From an environmental 
perspective, while an increase in the contribution of nuclear energy to electricity 
generation capacity can assist in the reduction of Co2 emissions in the short 
term, in the longer term, nuclear capacity creates serious challenges such as 
spent fuel and nuclear waste disposal, as well as increased risks in terms of the 
unsanctioned use of enriched uranium. In economic terms, although nuclear 
energy directly increases the global availability of electricity, it is similar to fossil 
fuels in the sense that it continues to rely on a finite resource. Furthermore, 
the experience of another African country, Niger, shows little evidence of any 
positive impact of a large uranium extraction industry on local development. 
Nuclear power generation requires considerable economies of scale and should 
ideally be distributed through a national or regional grid, and is therefore far 
more suited to industrial electricity supply than to meeting the energy needs of 
average Africans living outside areas of grid coverage62. 
Southern Africa possesses abundant renewable energy reserves; solar radiation 
levels in South Africa and Namibia are amongst the highest in the world (Figure 
5), and both countries contain significant areas of semi-desert, unsuitable for 
agriculture, which can be utilised for solar energy accumulation facilities. In the 
DRC, construction of what is scheduled to be the world’s largest hydroelectric 
scheme, is currently underway on the Congo river’s Inga Falls. once completed, 
this facility will have an electricity generation capacity of 40 GW63 . Interestingly, 
this project does not involve the construction of large-scale dams and water 
reservoirs, and as a result, its potential environmental footprint is limited. 
Although no Russian companies are participating in the Inga Falls project, 
ALRoSA has already invested in the construction of smaller hydropower stations 
in Angola, and another Russian company, Tekhnopromexport, has acted as a 
contractor to a number of African hydroelectricity projects, thereby accumulating 
considerable experience in the field. 
South Africa possesses the world largest reserves of palladium, a platinum group 
metal used as a catalyst in hydrogen-powered engines - a solution for hybrid motor 
vehicles that is receiving increased attention in developed countries, particularly 
in Japan and the USA.
While renewable energy sources, particularly hydro-power, are capable of 
feeding into national grids, one of their most tangible benefits is that they 
are also particularly suitable for small-scale applications, and can therefore 
be owned and operated by the communities that they supply, rather than by 
governments or corporations located many miles away, or in some cases even on a 
different continent. In this context, bio-energy and in particular solar energy are 
increasingly viewed as a vital component of SADC’s rural (off-grid) electrification 
programmes, which have in many instances been slowed by the high costs of grid 
extension services. 
61 RBC Daily, 19 March 2007, http://www.rbcdaily.ru/2007/03/19/tek/268514
62 Du Plooy, P., 2008. Re-Think Investment in (South) Africa. WWF South Africa, Johannesburg, pp. 
36, 47 – 48.
63 BBC, 21 April 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7358542.stm
44 ReThINK RUSSIAN INVeSTMeNT IN SoUTheRN AFRICA
Figure 5. SolAr rADiAtion in Southern AFricAn countrieS, 
 KiloWAttS*hrS/m2/DAy
In addition to plans for new energy generation capacity, the potential exists for 
Russia and South Africa to cooperate in the implementation of projects aimed 
at increased efficiency in the use of already available energy resources and the 
reduction of their Co2 emissions. Under the Kyoto Protocol, Joint Implementation 
projects in Russia and CDM projects in Southern Africa offer significant 
opportunities to increase energy efficiency in a commercially beneficial manner. 
Although neither Russia or the Southern African countries are required to reduce 
their GhG emissions during the Kyoto Protocol’s implementation period, ending 
in 2012, a new negotiated international agreement that replaces the Protocol 
may impose such requirements. Under such circumstances, it is obvious that 
the energy-intensive facilities owned by Russian investors in Southern Africa, in 
particular non-ferrous metal smelters, will need to substantially improve their 
energy efficiency standards. In this regard the Russian company Factor Ltd. has 
already begun working with South Africa’s Eskom on energy-saving projects.
 Source: Cuamba B, 2008. Sustainable energy Pathways for the SADC Region. Presentation  
                               at the DFID-DSA  policy forum International Development in the Face of Climate Change: 
                               Beyond Mainstreaming?,  Greenwich, 2 June 2008.
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Through various multilateral (including the G8), as well as unilateral initiatives, 
post-Soviet Russia has to date written off USD 16 billion of African debt64. In 2006 
and 2007, Russia annually contributed over USD 100 million to various multilateral 
oDA initiatives65. These funds were for the most part channeled through existing 
international oDA bodies, such as various UN funds and organisations. These aid 
activities are planned to continue, in line with the Concept of Russia’s Participation 
in International Development Assistance (2007). In the medium term, Russia is 
likely to create its own Foreign Aid Agency, and also become a member of the African 
Development Bank, with the latter step intended to promote the participation by 
Russian companies in African tenders. These measures will also seek to broaden 
Russia’s involvement in Africa’s development policies. 
At the same time, Russia’s financial institutions are increasing their operations 
in Africa, for example through the provision of loans to industrial projects in 
which Russian companies are participating, financial consultancy services and 
the organisation of IPOs for African companies. The financial institutions most 
heavily involved in these activities are the newly-established Russian Development 
Bank (reformed Vnesheconombank), the state-owned VTB bank, and Renaissance 
Capital (RenCap), a privately-owned Russian investment house66. 
Given the considerable environmental footprint of the majority of projects 
financed by Russian banks in Africa, it is essential that Russian financial 
institutions, including their subsidiaries in Africa, begin to apply international 
environmental standards in the evaluation of project finance opportunities. 
Such standards include voluntary benchmarks for managing environmental and 
social issues, such as the Equator Principles, which have been adopted by more 
than 50 financial institutions worldwide, with these institutions accounting for 
approximately 70 – 80 percent of the global project finance market. Unfortunately, 
however, in contrast to financial institutions in many EMEs, no Russian bank 
has to date accepted such voluntary obligations. In South Africa, Nedbank, which 
has entered into a partnership agreement with Vnesheconombank, and Standard 
Bank, which in early 2009 announced its acquisition of a stake in Russia’s Troika 
Dialog Bank, are parties to the Equator Principles.
The measures identified in this report form the basis for hedging commodities revenues 
for the future, by investing them in sustainable business solutions. Rethinking 
Russia’s investment in Southern Africa might involve additional costs in the short 
term, both in financial and administrative terms, but this expenditure should be 
viewed as capital investment rather than costs. Furthermore, the returns on this 
investment, in the form of increased environmental sustainability and national and 
corporate competitiveness, are certain to be far in excess of the initial expenditure for 
both Russia and Southern Africa, and in fact for the world as a whole.
3.3. RUSSIA’S 
EFFORTS TO 
DEVELOP AN 
ASSISTANCE 
PROGRAMME
64 All Africa, 4 April 2008, http://allafrica.com/stories/200804040246.html
65 New Africa, 29 May 2007, http://newafrica.ru/anonses/070604/ru_af1.htm
66  VTB, 2 September 2007, http://www.vtb.ru/rus/web.html?s1=1052&s2=13407&s3=1&l=1; Business 
Report, 31 May 2008, http://www.busrep.co.za/index.php?fSectionId=570&fArticleId=3858930
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CONCLUSION
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In 2008/9, the financial crisis, which has been followed in most countries by real 
sector recession and declines in commodity prices, has provided strong incentives 
for drastic reviews of economic strategies by all countries, including Russia and 
the Southern African nations. As a result, some of the sustainability improvement 
measures recommended by environmentalists have been driven by a totally 
different imperative; namely a lack of availability of funds for investment, 
leading in turn to decisions to delay investment in, or even to disinvestment 
from, capital-, resource- and energy-intensive projects.   
In South Africa, the national electricity supplier, eskom, announced its decision 
to postpone the construction and commissioning of the country’s second nuclear 
power plant by two years, citing cost as a major reason67. In Russia, major outward 
investors have started scaling down their overseas investment programmes, 
most of which are related to the acquisition and development of assets in the 
commodity sector. For example, Norilsk Nickel, Russia’s largest investor in 
Southern Africa, announced disinvestment plans for its nickel production and 
processing operations in Botswana and South Africa68.
As argued in a recent report by Deutsche Bank, entitled economic Stimulus: The 
Case for ‘Green’ Infrastructure, energy Security and ‘Green’ Jobs, one possible 
way out of the current economic meltdown that involves considerable employment 
cuts in conventional industries, may lie in investment into so-called ‘green’ 
sectors of the economy, since these are generally more diversified, sustainable 
and labour-intensive than sectors seen as traditional drivers of economic growth. 
For example, the Center for American Progress (CAP) calculated that investment 
of USD 100 billion in clean energy and efficiency would result in 2 million new 
jobs, whereas an investment in conventional forms of energy would create only 
approximately 540,000 jobs69. This conclusion could be similarly applied in Africa, 
where sustainability and unemployment problems, aggravated by the current 
market turbulence, are far more acute than in the developed world. 
In spite of its very tangible and widespread negative impact on the global economy, 
the current economic crisis provides a significant incentive for making economic 
development choices more environmentally sustainable, thereby limiting 
the possibility for further turmoil in the financial and real sectors of a world 
economy that might otherwise continue to be based almost exclusively on the 
exploitation of natural resources. The fall of commodity prices makes the case for 
economic diversification stronger both in Russia and in the nations of Southern 
Africa. Furthermore, while in the period 2009–11, the realisation of large-scale 
investment projects by Russian companies in Southern Africa is unlikely, given 
the capital constraints they face, this period may very well provide the best 
opportunities for cooperation between Russian and Southern African companies 
in areas such as leapfrogging technologies, energy- and resource-savings and 
renewable energy development.
67 Reuters, 12 January 2009; http://af.reuters.com/article/investingNews/idAFJoe50B0hR20090112 
68 RIA Novosti, 17 January 2009; http://www.rian.ru/economy/20090117/159469833.html
69 economic Stimulus: The Case for ‘Green’ Infrastructure, energy Security and ‘Green’ Jobs. 
Deutsche Bank, November 2008, p. 4; http://www.dbadvisors.com/deam/stat/globalResearch/1113_
GreeneconomicStimulus.pdf  
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